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Deontic Logic and Legal Systems, by Pablo E. Navarro and Jorge L. 
Rodriguez (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014, paperback, ISBN 
978-0-521-13990-8, 261 pages). 
Topic and objective of the book 
As the title Deontic Logic and Legal Systems indicates, Pablo E. Navarro and 
Jorge L. Rodriguez’s new book intends to offer an introduction to the logic of 
norms and some fundamental legal concepts. It aims to be an analytical 
exercise on deontic logic and in particular legal systems. That is to say, the 
monograph is a theoretically orientated discussion of how and why deontic 
logic may be used in order to have a better grasp of broadly normative 
systems and, more specifically, the legal system. Nevertheless, as Navarro 
and Rodriguez make clear in the Preface, the book is limited by its aim since it 
presents the reader an introductory view only and therefore it offers a 
simplified version in order to tackle philosophically relevant issues in law. As a 
direct consequence, a more careful analysis of many problems has been put 
aside for now. 
Navarro and Rodriguez, two Argentinean scholars that are part of a 
generation of Continental style legal philosophers bring us what promises to 
be a new analysis of the legal discourse by means of applying deontic logic. 
Both these authors have published monographs before, and a considerable 
number of papers in several journals that have to do with legal theory or legal 
philosophy. Often written and published in Spanish, Navarro and Rodriguez’s 
latest publication Deontic Logic and Legal Systems is a new account of an 
issue arguably central to jurisprudence in an attempt to cross the imaginary 
bridge between two at times irreconcilable styles. The authors march through 
a very high level of abstraction in legal philosophy Continental tradition to 
bring deontic logic and its application to the legal discourse this time, more 
provocatively, with an Anglo-American twist. 
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Applied for the first time by Von Wright1, the term deontic logic refers to 
normative orders in three different ways, that is—in short—a prohibition, a 
permission, or an obligation. Traditionally, logic refers to true or false 
statements. Therein, and simply put, a conclusion will be true or false 
depending on whether the premises are true or false. Indeed, this has to do 
with propositions that are evidently descriptive. But there are other 
propositions that are non-descriptive and, amongst the latter, those that are 
prescriptive—i.e. they may state an obligation, a permission, or a prohibition. 
These non-descriptive propositions that are prescriptions are not capable of 
having “true” values in logic. Arguably, we may be able to establish logic 
inferences departing from descriptive prescriptions or, what in legal theory we 
may call norm-propositions. The legal discourse as part of one of these 
normative systems uses prescriptive language. Therein, deontic logic may be 
applied as an interpretative tool in order to better understand issues related to 
the semantic and syntactic use of legal norms or rules.  
Navarro and Rodriguez aim to offer the novel reader in legal theory or legal 
philosophy an elemental insight into deontic logic by presenting basic 
conceptual elements and formulas first, and from there to demonstrate how 
they apply in particular to a specific normative system, that is law. 
Book outline 
The book is divided in two parts, and each part has three chapters, all divided 
in five sections. The first part—i.e. Part I—offers a brief introduction to basic 
concepts and ideas on classical logic. Chapter 1 starts by characterising logic 
and some of its elemental terms—i.e. validity, truth, and logical form. 
Thereafter, the language of logic is presented including propositional calculus, 
atomic and molecular formulas. Section 1.3 reminds us of the modal and 
deontic logic and the fundamental deontic concepts, that is obligation, 
prohibition, and permission; whilst Section 1.4 compares different systems of 
deontic logic—e.g. minimal, classical, and standard systems. The Chapter 
finishes discussing the possibility of deontic logic and whether norms are 
                                                 
1 Georg Henrik Von Wright, ‘Deontic Logic’ 60 (1951) Mind 1. 
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capable of having truth-values. Chapter 2 deals with “Paradoxes and 
Shortcomings of Deontic Logic.” The authors cover briefly the Ross’ paradox, 
the paradox of derived obligation, the McLaughlin’s paradox, the free choice 
permission paradox to start with. Thereafter, what the authors call “more 
serious challenges” are introduced—i.e. the good Samaritan paradox, and the 
contrary-to-duty paradoxes—followed by the Jørgensen’s dilemma, Kelsen’s 
logical argument in the legal domain, Ross and the logic of satisfaction, 
validity as binding force and as membership in a normative system, and yet 
the possibility of the indirect application of logic to norms. The last two 
sections have to do with whether norms bear truth-values. Therein, both sides 
of the story are presented—i.e. deontic logic with truth and deontic logic 
without truth—, norms and norm-formulation are distinguished, and two 
conceptions of norms are characterised, that is the pragmatic conception and 
the semantic conception. Chapter 3 “Norm-propositions, Conditional Norms, 
and Defeasibility” starts by distinguishing norms from statements about 
norms, or norms strictly speaking and norm-propositions. To clarify the 
distinction, two notions of negation for norm-proposition are defined: a) 
external negation; and b) internal negation. Rodriguez and Navarro show why 
the distinction between norms and norm-propositions cannot be maintained 
within the semantic conception of norms. In contrast, by reference to 
Alchourrón and  Bulygin2, the authors show how within the pragmatic 
conception, norms would be conceived as acts of prescriptions and therefore, 
there would not be capable of having truth-values. Conditional norms follow in 
the next section, and they are seen through the insular conception and the 
bridge conception, neither of which is free from difficulties. The Chapter 
continues with the distinct forms deontic modus ponens may assume, that is 
factual detachment and deontic detachment; and finishes with the so-called 
defeasible deontic logics owed either to failure of factual detachment or to 
failure of deontic detachment.  
The second part—i.e. Part II—refers specifically to logic in relation to legal 
systems. Chapter 4 introduces de concept of “legal validity.” The authors point 
                                                 
2 Carlos Alchourrón and Eugenio Bulygin, Normative Systems (Wein, New York: Springer 
Verlag, 1971). 
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out the more often than not confusion between this and other concepts such 
as existence and legality in the creation of the norms. Kelsen3 is introduced as 
a start point and some remarks on his Pure Theory of Law intend to show the 
misunderstanding. Section 4.2 presents us the scope and force of legal norms 
through the lenses of internal applicability and external applicability of such 
norms. Thereafter, Rodriguez and Navarro discuss the relationship between 
applicability and validity, and whether there is a necessary one between the 
two. In this section, they remind us of the views of many heavy weights in 
legal theory—e.g. Kelsen, Hart, Bulygin, Schauer. Unsurprisingly, the next 
section includes the notion of hierarchy within legal orders and basic issues 
related to legal interpretation are mentioned—i.e. lex superior, lex posterior, 
conflicting norms, inconsistency. Section 4.5 is entitled “Two Concepts of 
Legal Systems.” In reality, it offers the views of different legal philosophers in 
order to characterise what a legal order is. Starting with Kelsen, Hart follows 
with his criticism, Raz is mentioned, and Dworkin’s more recent distinction of 
different concepts of law seems to act as a conclusion for the whole Chapter. 
As any system, legal orders bring about some problems that need solving. 
Chapter 5 reminds us of normative gaps and conflicts of norms. Following 
Alchourrón and Bulygin, we are introduced to the formal properties of 
applicable systems in Section 5.1. Incompleteness, inconsistency, and 
redundancy are defined and dealt with using the Argentinean legal system to 
exemplify. Section 5.2 discusses whether a legal system may have gaps 
starting with Kelen’s notion by which non-prohibited actions are considered as 
implicitly regulated and therefore permitted. Raz and Dworkin’s views follow. 
But Rodriguez and Navarro remind us that normative gaps are not merely 
situations not regulated by the law. Indeed, the normative gaps should be 
distinguished from the axiological gaps. Another legal conflict is listed in 
Section 5.4, that of normative contradiction or coherence. The Chapter 
finishes with a recount of the legal conflicts previously introduced and the 
thesis of defeasibility of legal norms.  Different arguments are presented and 
explored as a way to conclude. 
                                                 
3 Hans Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law (Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith, 1960). 
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The last Chapter—i.e. Chapter 6—introduces the idea of legal dynamics 
starting with Raz and his distinction between momentary and non-momentary 
legal systems. Section 6.2 focuses the attention on two key moments in any 
legal order, that of the incorporation and that of the elimination of norms. In 
other words, “promulgation” and “derogation.” Once again the authors decide 
to follow Alchourrón and Bulygin when presenting the two approaches for 
legal dynamics in Section 6.3. Within the legal dynamics, Rodriguez and 
Navarro explore logical consequences using the Argentinean legal order to 
exemplify. The last Section of the book evaluates whether legal orders contain 
all the logical consequences of enacted norms and the role of social sources. 
Finally, the Epilogue acts both as a summary of the key conceptual elements 
and issues presented throughout the book, and an overall conclusion. 
Evaluation of the book: its content and method 
Jurisprudence, legal theory, or legal philosophy have stimulated discussion 
from very early in the history of mankind. It is true, as Eugenio Bulygin refers 
in the Prologue of Deontic Logic and Legal Systems, that we have proof of 
these reflections—in a very broad sense—as early as in Ancient Greece. 
Indeed, these early discussions were mainly philosophical in nature and 
somehow covered what it is nowadays understood as legal issues too—at 
least if we have an ample view of what legal issues mean. That is because 
legal philosophy or legal theory offer a different kind of discourse for analysis, 
even for a logician and philosopher: the normative character of the law.  
The need to comprehend the way in which law is created and applied is 
paramount in every culture. We may go even beyond—i.e. law is one of the 
very few sciences in which we still ask how to define its object and the nature 
of that object we call in general “law.” One of the ways to study this multi-
faceted object is through the analysis of its normative concepts—e.g. norm, 
rule, permission, prohibition, and obligation. Moreover, one of the ways to 
study these normative concepts is by using techniques and methods 
developed by logicians. And that is exactly the aim of Rodriguez and 
Navarro’s latest book. Deontic Logic and Legal Systems offers an insight on 
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how formal analysis may be applied to the normative discourse. As we know, 
law is one of many normative systems. Therein, Rodriquez and Navarro 
intend to show us how deontic logic may be essential in understanding both 
the semantic dimension of law and also its dynamic one.  
Some points should be made clear before we refer to Deontic Logic and Legal 
Systems in detail. Firstly, the study of the law and its nature has to do with 
several elements and may be done from several angles—i.e. logic, politics, 
economics, morals, only to name a few. Indeed, law is a multi-faceted concept 
with application in different realms and at different levels. These elements 
may be reviewed separately from a theoretical point of view. But we must 
remind ourselves that in practice they will always be somehow related. Any 
legal norm may bring about complex realities that have to do with, for 
example, law but also power, morals, and many other implications. So 
Rodriguez and Navarro’s book will be limited by default in the sense they will 
tackle one of the many realms law may offer—i.e. legal systems and how 
deontic logic may help in better understanding them. Secondly, a fact that 
Eugenio Buligyn in his Prologue mentions and Rodriguez and Navarro refer to 
in their Preface: to study a normative system such as law through the lenses 
of deontic logic has traditionally been rather limited to Continental Europe and 
Latin America. Although we may find elaborated works such as The Concept 
of a Legal System4, it is a fact that the Anglo-American tradition in legal theory 
and legal philosophy is not as rich when referred to the analysis of normative 
discourse using technics and methods borrowed from logicians. In that sense, 
Rodriguez and Navarro’s book is already a valuable addition to the legal 
philosophy literature in the English language. With Deontic Logic and Legal 
Systems they attempt to bridge that imaginary gap between two different 
styles, that is the so-called Continental and Anglo-American ones. To an 
extent, as I will show in the following paragraphs, they have been successful. 
Last but not least, Rodriguez and Navarro’s book introduces us to the world of 
logical thinking within law from the level of the beginner. It is a fact that for 
someone more experienced these pages may sound familiar—at times, even 
                                                 
4 Joseph Raz, The Concept of a Legal System. An Introduction to the Theory of Legal System 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980). 
Page 7 of 13 
 
too familiar. But the authors are clear in their Preface that this is an 
introductory work and therein, simplification of complex problems is to be 
expected. Navarro and Rodriguez go further and concede that a more careful 
analysis of many problems has been put aside for an advanced book. 
Part I “Introduction to Deontic Logic” is essential to any new scholar that 
wants to have a grasp of how the language of logic may be applied into law. 
With Chapter 1 “The Language of Logic and the Possibility of Deontic Logic” 
the authors are able to combine complex vocabulary and logical formulas in 
an accessible and very comprehensible way for the beginner in legal 
philosophy. Navarro and Rodriguez apply the same methodology throughout 
their monograph—i.e. they start from very basic individual elements in logic 
and deontic logic and build up by adding basic formulas. Once these basic 
formulas are introduced examples with regards law are always presented. 
Thereafter, more complex conceptual elements and formulas will follow. For 
instance, Chapter 1, Section 1 gives us a very broad introduction into the 
world of logic and argumentation. Very basic elements in logical 
argumentation are introduced, that is premises and conclusion. Therein, 
simple and colourful yet very effective examples are offered in order to make 
clear the aforementioned conceptual elements. Only after several examples of 
the kind, the authors move onto reviewing these statements through the 
lenses of formal logic. As a result, by the end of the first section in the book, 
the reader should already have a basic understanding of elemental 
components in any logical argumentation and be aware of the way in which a 
logician applies symbolic schemas.  
The following section—i.e. Chapter 1, Section 2—goes beyond elemental 
components and introduces the reader to propositional calculus. Indeed, a 
complex way in which sentences describing states of affairs can be reviewed 
through the lenses of propositional letters. Once again, Navarro and 
Rodriguez start by presenting the basic elements—e.g. propositional letters p, 
q, r, propositional connectors, and more. Only after making clear these 
elements the authors demonstrate how they may be combined—i.e. truth 
table. As before, examples follow. 
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By the end of Chapter 1 the reader should be able to understand how basic 
elements in logic and deontic logic may be applied into legal discourse and 
how to review legal arguments using basic logic formulas. Moreover, within 
the last part of Chapter 1—and in all other chapters—Navarro and Rodriguez 
bring about the work of classical and more modern legal philosophers such as 
Von Wright, Kripke, Åqvist, and many others in order to broaden the reader’s 
understanding on the matter and, if I may say, could act as a catalyser to 
encourage further independent research. 
Although it is mainly a descriptive monograph in the sense most of its pages 
are dedicated to the explanation of deontic logics, its basic elements and 
formulas applied to legal discourse, Navarro and Rodriguez are able to 
include at times critical evaluation too, for example, by questioning the mere 
“Possibility of Deontic Logic.” Indeed, for anyone with previous knowledge in 
legal philosophy the content of that analysis may not be enough. However, we 
must remind ourselves that this is an introductory book and in consequence, 
Navarro and Rodriguez are already going the extra mile even with only 
introducing open-ended questions. 
Part II “Logic and Legal Systems” is probably the most ambitious in this book 
both in terms or content and extension. Indeed, Rodriguez and Navarro try to 
include key conceptual elements that have to do with law—e.g. validity, 
existence, gaps—while referring to authors that go from Kelsen and Hart to 
Schauer. Thus, Rodriguez and Navarro proceed in that way by introducing a 
reference to the logical and axiological side of these elements, their mutual 
implications, and the well-known difference in jurisprudence between static 
and dynamic view.  Indeed, a herculean task for a monograph let alone one of 
its parts. For the novel jurisprudence reader, it may result in a basic way to 
approach law through logic. However, this same reader should be made 
aware that the theories referred too—in particular the views of Hans Kelsen 
and H.L.A. Hart—are presented in an oversimplified manner and disjointed 
from the respective bodies of literature they are original parts of. 
As an example, Chapter 4, Section 1 “Normative Systems and the Existence 
of Norms” includes some remarks on Hans Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law with 
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regards the connection between validity and existence of the norms. But the 
authors are unclear about the meaning of the latter. Indeed, they include a 
broad Kelsenian characterisation of validity in order to immediately attempt to 
demonstrate Kelsen’s confusion between that concept and existence. 
However, unless the reader is someone used to the Kelsenian way of 
understanding and evaluating legal concepts, the introduction of a self-evident 
conflict is not that obvious. 
Another example of oversimplification is the almost dogmatic assumption that 
for Hans Kelsen all norms must have an element of coercion in order to be 
considered part of the normative system we call law. It is true, as Navarro and 
Rodriguez state that Kelsen’s theory is not free from complex difficulties and 
shortcomings but, if that was the case, their contribution to the legal 
philosophy is far from being guilty of charge. 
Chapter 5 makes evident an arguably constant element in Rodriguez and 
Navarro’s monograph—i.e. the almost intrinsic link with Alchourrón and 
Bulygin’s Normative Systems. These pages include a very brief account of 
this seminal work in legal philosophy. For instance, the references to 
incompleteness, inconsistency, or redundancy are both brief and effective. In 
only a couple of paragraphs the authors are able to give a clear picture of 
these notions and implications. However, they are not successful this time 
with the examples. Knowing that both authors are originally from Argentina, it 
is understandable that they may refer to localisms or regionalisms when 
providing particular insights in the form of exemplifications. Nevertheless, for a 
monograph that is intended for the global audience, a certain level of 
abstraction is to be expected. In particular, since Freitas/Vélez Sársfield’s 
examples assume the reader will have a basic degree of knowledge with 
regards civil law legislation that may be crucial at a given time and in a given 
place but are far from being accessible to a legal philosophy novel reader that 
may not have any prior knowledge of who Freitas or /Vélez Sársfield were, let 
alone their work. 
Finally, the authors refer in Chapter 6 to legal dynamics following a similar 
methodology to the one presented in Chapter 5. With a promising start by 
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introducing Raz the authors move once again onto Alchourrón and Bulygin. 
The rest of the Chapter results in a brief summary of Alchourrón and Bulygin’s 
approaches and therefore it is mainly descriptive. Examples follow but once 
again they are limited to the Argentinean legal system so some readers may 
find difficulty in grasping the application of these conceptual elements without 
prior knowledge of certain localisms or regionalisms. 
General comment on the book  
Rodriguez and Navarro’s latest monograph offers a well-written example of 
what we do when we use abstraction to review legal discourse, it includes an 
extensive bibliography for those who want to further their research, and it is 
copiously footnoted.  
Whether Rodriguez and Navarro have chosen a useful objective will be for the 
reader to decide. Indeed, for the Anglo-American tradition in legal philosophy 
and legal theory may be a useful resource in the sense analytical style could 
benefit from the application of value-neutral deontic logics. However, it is true 
that the Anglo-American legal philosopher more inclined to pragmatism and a 
black-letter law approach may see the use of such level of abstraction and 
formulism rather questionable in what has to do with its usefulness.  
Indeed, as a whole deontic logic introduces the reader into a mainly 
theoretical exercise and may, in principle, be assumed to have theoretical 
interest and importance only. Nevertheless, many of the conceptual elements 
and formulas reviewed, studied, and applied in deontic logics such as 
permission, obligation, and prohibition have to do with the way in which our 
behavior is seen and expected to be seen within society or, put it in different 
terms, in our life when in interrelation with other human beings. Therein, 
deontic logic will by default have a certain degree of practical relevance too 
since whichever the normative system we refer to—e.g. law, morality, 
religion—they all will have to do with broadly either the creation or application 
of rules or norms that regulate human behavior. Hence, a better 
understanding of the way in which these conceptual elements and formulas 
work will simply result in a better understanding of how the rules or norms 
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applied and created by and for human beings work, their nature, and their 
semantic and syntactic implications. 
With regards the method Navarro and Rodriguez apply, it would be 
appropriate to think of this monographs as—literally—two different parts. The 
first one, probably the more accessible and useful for a novel reader in legal 
philosophy introduces us gently to the world of logic and deontic logic applied 
to normative discourse, in particular, the legal one. Basic conceptual elements 
are clearly defined, several examples that could potentially be applied 
anywhere in the world without previous necessary knowledge are offered, and 
classical and more modern theories are hinted. It is unfortunate the second 
part does not follow suit. Mainly inspired in the work of Alchourrón and 
Bulygin’s Normative Systems the three last Chapters are a brief presentation 
of the key elements of the former. Moreover, the examples provided have to 
do with Argentina and the Argentinean legal system so the level of abstraction 
and generality presented in the first part of the monograph is missing. 
Therein, a more robust understanding of this part and the conceptual 
individual elements, structures, and classifications offered may remain 
inaccessible for the level of the beginner—and in consequence, it would not 
fulfil one of the core aims of this book. In other words, the novel reader in 
legal theory or legal philosophy may find the first part of the monograph a 
good start in order to develop a basic understanding of deontic logic applied 
to law. However, if he wished to have that same level of understanding about 
how normative systems differ from a static and dynamic point of view, the 
relevance of assuming the existence of normative gaps, and many more 
issues that are fundamental to jurisprudence, the same novel reader would 
have to further his research. 
In tune with the previous paragraphs, there is a certain degree of contribution 
to the debate on the subject matter. What Navarro and Rodriguez intend to do 
in the sense of bridging the gap between Anglo-American and Continental 
styles when referring to legal theory is of an immense value. The same legal 
discourse reviewed by two different scholars from two different traditions 
brings about at times problems that may appear to be irreconcilable. Let us 
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think of, for example, the way in which Kelsen’s works have been 
misinterpreted when translated into English and, in particular, after Hart’s 
criticism that has become a dogmatic view in Anglo-American legal 
philosophy. Therein, by being familiar with value-neutral deontic logics it is 
likely that these two scholars might finally agree on the methodology to be 
applied when reviewing legal discourse, they would be able to utilise the same 
formulas and level of abstraction, and in the case of disagreement, they would 
be in the presence of a real difference of opinions rather than these opinions 
being different because they simply depart from different conceptual 
elements, or better expressed, they use different lenses when reviewing them. 
 
With regards the future of deontic logic applied to the legal discourse a word 
of caution is appropriate at this point. Navarro and Rodriguez’s monograph is 
an introductory work as they make clear several times. Therein, the 
contribution to the subject matter is mainly of didactic nature and for 
academics in the classroom and their students mainly. Similarly, it may be 
considered as being a source of future academic writing in two ways, that is a) 
as the first step into a more elaborated and more detailed monograph that 
may actually bridge the differences between the Continental and the Anglo-
American style; and b) as a valuable resource for the jurisprudence, legal 
theory, or legal philosophy student in order to have a better understanding of 
legal discourse and legal reasoning. 
Final words: recommendation 
Deontic Logic and Legal Systems is a welcome addition to the literature that 
considers the legal discourse from a level of abstraction that only legal theory 
or legal philosophy can offer. But while other authors have either followed 
Continental or Anglo-American tradition, Navarro and Rodriguez have 
attempted to bring the two together. Moreover, they have envisioned to do so 
from the level of the beginner.  
Whether to recommend the book to the reader will depend, once again, on 
what type of reader we refer to. This book follows eminently Continental style 
but rather than being written in Italian, Spanish, or German, it is presented in 
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English. Therefore, if the novel Anglo-American reader in legal philosophy 
was familiar with Continental style or decided to challenge himself, I would 
wholeheartedly recommend the book. However, for the reader who expects to 
be presented with a monograph that has finally been able to bridge the 
difference in style, and not only does he seek a translation of language but 
also an adaptation of stylistic nature, that reader should keep on waiting. 
Indeed, this monograph could have perfectly been written in Spanish and this 
review could have been only about its translation into English. For a more 
elaborated and detailed work, as Navarro and Rodriguez suggest in the 
Preface may follow in the future, it would be advisable for the authors to either 
think of a less ambitious claim and make clear they will follow Continental 
tradition in style, or to actually adapt the style and apply the Anglo-American 
one. 
In addition to the style, if the recommendation has to be centred on the level 
of analysis and the insight the monograph offers into deontic logics applied to 
legal discourse, the authors are very clear: this book is introductory in nature, 
and they are right. Particularly useful for the novel reader in legal philosophy 
or legal theory because of the accessible methodology applied, Part I. The 
same reader, however, may find Part II rather more challenging. 
All in all, Navarro and Rodriguez offer another means to keep us all engaged 
with the most abstract side of the legal discourse and its debate, and with that 
only the novel and more experienced reader in legal philosophy or legal 
theory should already be grateful. Indeed, for the Anglo-American reader 
more used to a black-letter law approach when dealing with normative 
systems this monograph may be both a challenging yet illuminating 
experience. 
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